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Abstract 
 
Free movement of labour and open borders are one of the main principles of the 
European Union. Workers can relatively easy relocate in the search for new job 
opportunities and firms compete internationally for productive labour. Corporate 
taxes affect firms’ profits, and also their investment decisions. The costs associated 
with employment on the other hand have not been studied to the same extent. They do 
however affect the returns to the investment by impacting production costs and the 
ability to attract and retain productive labour. In theory therefore, expensive labour 
(i.e. high tax wedges) should lead more restrictive FDI inflows. 
This paper uses bilateral panel data on FDI flows in the EU-15 to analyse the impact 
of tax wedges on labour on foreign direct investment decisions. The tax wedge is the 
ratio between the labour cost and the net salary of that labourer. By using this 
indicator I try to capture the effects of total expensiveness of labour on firms’ 
decisions of investing abroad. I use data for the EU-15 countries in order to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity and due to the relative mobility of labour in those 
countries. I employ a gravity equation in my efforts to derive the determinants of FDI-
flows and I find that tax wedges in general and employee social security contributions 
in particular do affect the investment decision of intra-EU15 FDI in a negative way.  
Due to many zero bilateral observations I use a Heckman two-step estimation model, 
which controls for sample selection bias and effectively controls for non-existing and 
negative flows from the regression. For robustment checks I also employ a tobit 
estimation and a fixed effect estimation. The purpose of this paper is to analyze 
whether cross-country differences in the tax wedge affects investment decisions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
I will empirically analyse the impact of tax wedges on incoming foreign direct 
investments. Generally, most types of taxes are thought to have a dampening effect on 
FDI, mainly because the profits that companies seek to make can be kept larger in 
economies with similar economic structures but with lower taxes. The determinants of 
inflows of FDI differ widely depending on what types of economies are analysed. For 
instance flows to the EU151 are not determined by the same factors as inflows to sub-
Saharan countries. In order to be able to draw relevant conclusions for Sweden I will 
examine bilateral intra EU15 FDI flows. The EU15 countries are characterized by 
relatively stabile exogenous variables and this allows me to focus on the determinants 
of FDI that I wish to study. The labor market is also relatively mobile, in 2008 over 
1,1% of the total workforce moved internally, indicating an elastic labor supply that 
answers to cross-country differences (EU, 2008). Moreover the data on the EU15 
countries is homogenous and extensive, which simplifies cross-country comparisons. 
Foreign direct investments are generally assumed to impact the host economy in a 
positive way, primarily by contributing to increased capital accumulation and 
technological development (Fregert K. and Jonung L., 2010). By using tax wedges as 
a dependent variable I wish to analyse whether FDI-inflows are affected and 
consequently if the positive spillovers associated with FDI are deterred by high 
wedges. 
The amount of papers looking at the effects of corporate taxes on FDI are 
overwhelming, but surprisingly other types of taxes have not been studied to the same 
extent. Researchers tend to argue that corporate taxes affect FDI decisions in a 
relatively large negative way, with estimates of semi-elasticities ranging from -5 to 0 
with a median of -2.9 (De Mooij & Ederveen, 2006). Reasonably, taxes that should be 
of interest to study are the ones that in any way affect the profits and thus also the 
investment decisions of companies. By assuming that capital is more mobile than 
labour and therefore also more affected by differences between countries, taxes on 
capital have been studied to a greater extent. I however argue that taxes on labour, and 
labour costs in general also influence firms’ investment decisions, particularly those 
levied on knowledge intensive and high-skilled labour. The tax wedge, which is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Countries that count as old EU members or EU15 are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
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measured by the income tax plus employee and employer social security contributions 
as a % of total labour costs, captures the total expensiveness of labour in relation to 
what workers actually earn. Total labour costs are defined as gross pay together with 
employee and employer social security contributions. A high tax wedge therefore 
implies that the workers’ take-home pay makes up a relatively small part of total 
labour costs, leading to big costs associated with wage increases. Therefore a country, 
whose work force is expensively employed and accompanied with higher costs in 
comparison to its trading partners, should deter inflows of FDI. Also high tax wedges 
within the EU have been found to correlate negatively with employment, indicating 
that employer and employee social security contributions, together with income taxes, 
have a positive impact on unemployment (Dolenc & Laporsek, 2010). Consequently 
this ought to deter FDI.  
Intra EU15 FDI is to a greater extent characterized by horizontal FDI rather 
than vertical FDI. Since the common market enables firms to actively and cost-
effectively distribute products throughout the union, there is reason to assume that 
expanding operations primarily imply the duplication of activities in order to 
penetrate markets. The gains from selling locally are thus larger than the costs of 
entering foreign markets through trade or licencsing. Since trade barriers, and trading 
costs in the union are relatively low, the incentives to purchase or set up a new 
business facility must offset the costs associated by that investment. Consequently, 
high tax wedges on labour imply higher costs, eventually affecting firms’ profits and 
reshaping the advantageousness of the mode of entry. Labour taxes ought therefore to 
be important in that investment decision and by using panel data on bilateral FDI 
flows and stocks I will analyse the impact of tax wedges on labour on FDI decisions.  
A tax wedge is by the OECD defined as the ratio between the amount of taxes 
paid for an average single worker without children and the corresponding total labour 
cost for the employer. It gives valuable information about income taxes paid by 
workers and the social security contributions levied on employees and employers and 
therefore also on the marginal rate of transformation between labor and consumption 
(Black, et al., 2009). A higher tax wedge implies that a lesser proportion of total labor 
costs can be used for consumption. Also countries with a higher tax wedge on labor 
tend to display a higher total tax burden (OECD 2006b). How this affects the labor 
market and unemployment levels depend to a great deal on how the tax burden is 
distributed and also how the extra revenues are used. While being significantly 
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correlated with unemployment, redistribution of income or increased infrastructural 
investments may reduce unemployment, whereas actuarial components that are used 
to benefit workers during different phases in life may be counter-productive (OECDb, 
2006). The effects on FDI inflows are however relatively unknown. Income taxes in 
general are sought to dampen the inflows of FDI, and combined with larger statutory 
social security contributions the impact on FDI should be even greater. From a 
company perspective it makes sense that higher tax wedges on labor should 
discourage investments since it renders a more burdensome workforce and 
consequently lowers profits 
The paper will follow a two-stage Heckman estimation model where FDI 
decisions are seen as a process of two steps. Fist a company decides whether to invest 
or not, and second the amount to invest.  The analysis will be based on bilateral FDI 
flows and stocks to and from the EU15 and data on the tax wedge on labor in the 
EU15. Following the usage of cross-country differences I will also examine actual 
values on the tax wedge on labor and also if the effects are different when solely 
looking at employer and employee social security contributions and thus discarding 
the effects of the income tax. I will also use a tobit estimation and a panel data fixed 
effects model for robustness checks. 
The paper will be structured as follows. Part 2 will go through related 
literature and theory and discuss incentives for FDI, different forms of FDI and how 
tax wedges might impact FDI. Also part 2 will present theory regarding horizontal 
FDI and discern employee and employer social security contributions from the tax 
wedge. Part 3 gives an overview of the tax wedge on labor and FDI during the studied 
time period. Part 4 presents the data set, the methodology and the econometrics. Part 5 
will put forward the results while part 6 provides an analysis and a discussion and 
finally part 7 will conclude the paper. 
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2. Background 
2.1 FDI Motivations 
A company’s survival depend on the profits it makes. If its home market is not 
sufficient to ensure its survival or if the costs along different value chains are too 
high, the firm can choose to explore international options. Depending on what 
advantages the firm has over existing foreign competition; it can choose to enter the 
market in different ways. The investment decision process of MNEs (multinational 
enterprises) is complex and affected by a range of different factors. In order to 
simplify the analysis I will make use of the Eclectic Paradigm laid forward by 
Dunning in 1977. Basically it explains when MNEs choose the foreign direct 
investment option as a way to enter a foreign market. As shown in table 1 FDI will 
take place when the MNE has three simultaneous advantages, namely ownership, 
location and internalization.  
Figure 1: MNE advantages 
Source: Dunning J. H. (1977) 
The first advantage refers to a firm’s tangible or intangible assets. These could for 
instance be proprietary rights or transaction cost minimizing advantages. Location 
advantages are external advantages and include natural resources and other 
institutional, governmental and legal aspects that make it easier to do business. Lastly, 
internalization advantages refer to the benefits of controlling foreign production.  
In this breakdown of benefits, one could argue that the tax wedge would go 
under localization advantages. A lower tax wedge would imply a smaller difference 
between net pay and total labor costs and thus an advantage of that particular 
economy. On the other hand, depending on how big the different tax wedge 
components are their effects on FDI might also be different. For instance, as shown in 
Ownership	  advantage	  of	  the	  MNE	  VS	  Host	  country	  Airms	  
Location	  advantage	  of	  the	  host	  country	  VS	  Home	  country	  
Internalization	  advantage	  over	  foreign	  value-­‐added	  activities	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figure 3, the average tax wedge in Netherlands is 37,7%, while it is 38,4% in 
Denmark the components are totally different. In the Netherlands 39% of the tax 
wedge is made up of income tax, while in Denmark the income tax makes up 93% of 
the tax wedge. Even though their total effect on firm’s profits are almost the same, 
their components differ widely, and this might be important to the analysis. 
 
2.2 Different forms of FDI 
UNCTAD (2009) defines FDI as a long-term investment made to acquire interest in 
firms or enterprises outside of the economy of the investor. The purpose is to obtain 
and to be able to control and steer the management of the acquired investment. A 
threshold of 10% is needed in order for the investment to be qualified as a foreign 
direct investment. Moreover a direct investment encompasses partly the initial 
investment and all succeeding transactions both between the parent entity and the 
direct investment and among affiliated firms (OECD, 1996, 2006).  
FDI can either be seen as a stock or as a flow. While flows refer to capital 
transactions between the parent company and the affiliate, stocks refer to the share of 
the foreign company’s capital and indebtness. Capital transactions can be decomposed 
into equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. In order to be able to 
analyze the effects of tax wedges on FDI it is important to clarify the assumptions 
used in this paper. A foreign direct investment can be conducted in different ways; 
this paper however will not make any distinction between the different entry modes, 
the main reason being trouble obtaining reliable and sufficient data for the different 
investment types across the time period.  
Greenfield investment occurs when a foreign company sets up a completely 
new branch, research facility or other business establishment in a host country. 
Brownfield investments are related to greenfield investments in the sense that both 
aim to launch a new production activity. Brownfields however do this buy purchasing 
or leasing existing production facilities whereas greenfield investments imply the 
starting up of completely new facilities. Mergers & acquisitions (M&A) could 
basically be explained as the transfer of management. UNCTAD (2009) differentiates 
between three types of M&As; when a domestic company is sold to a foreign 
company, when a foreign affiliate is sold to a domestic company and when a foreign 
company purchases another foreign company in the same host country.  
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2.3 Tax wedges and FDI 
Wedges in general can be said to have a distorting effect on prices. Black et al. (2009) 
transmits this thinking to the labor market and points out that the relative prices of 
two commodities can deviate from their efficient value when subject to wedges. Tax 
wedges on labor can create price distortions between the price of consumption 
relative to the wage while affecting the marginal rate of transformation between 
consumption and labor. Specifically a larger tax wedge on labor, i.e. a bigger 
difference between total labor costs and the net pay, implies that more labor is needed 
for the same consumption levels. In turn this means that production is also associated 
with tax wedges on labor since it affects the firms total costs. Consequently a more 
expensive workforce caused by higher tax wedges should deter investments by 
increasing costs and also distort consumption prices relative to wage rates by making 
consumption more expensive. An Italian study conducted by Andrea Festa (2014) 
arrives at the conclusion that specifically northern Italy (which is far more 
industrialized than its southern counterpart) shows a negative relationship between tax 
wedges on labor and employment levels. Moreover Anamarija Separovic (2009) 
lengthens the analysis by including all OECD countries in her study on tax wedges on 
labor. She finds that tax wedges, by increasing firms’ labor costs, indirectly affect 
unemployment levels. Generally, authors tend to agree with the conclusion that tax 
wedges correlate negatively with unemployment levels and positively with 
employment levels. Turning to basic labor theory, illustrations on the taxation of labor 
point to the same direction (Borjas, 2013). By levying a tax on employment, 
regardless if it is assessed on firms or employers, the average wage and employment 
levels will decline. 
 Turning to labor productivity, which can be used as a measure of an 
economy’s competences and industrial effectiveness, Hong Ding (2008) uses a two-
stage least square fixed effect model on panel data on OECD countries. He finds that 
a one-percentage increase in the tax wedge on labor can lead to a 0,09 percentage 
decrease in labor productivity growth rate. Moreover Dolenc and Laporsek (2010) 
find that a one-percentage increase of the tax wedge on labor decreases employment 
growth in the EU-27 by 0,10 percentage points. In total, all studies I have found point 
to the same direction that tax wedges on labor impact both employment and 
productivity levels negatively.  
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2.3.1 Employer and employee social security contributions 
Part of the tax wedge consists of employee and employer social security 
contributions. In contrast to the tax wedge, they are measured as a percentage on 
gross pay. So when table 2 states that Sweden has an income tax of 13,2%, it means 
that 13,2% of the total labor cost are paid as income taxes. Nevertheless, table 2 
shows the employee and employer social security contribution levels across the time 
period and one can clearly see how Ireland has relatively low SSC contributions 
compared to its European counterparts. The effects of social security contributions on 
the economy have been studied, but the effects are somewhat ambiguous. Kerry 
Papps (2012) uses worker-level panel data for Turkey for 2002-2005 and points to the 
fact that an increase in social security taxes paid by employers and employees tend to 
decrease the probability of a worker remaining employed in the next quarter. One 
could argue that higher SSCs increase the cost of labor and consequently lowers the 
incentives to hire and retain labor. On the other hand social security contributions 
might also increase labor mobility, enabling dissatisfied workers with the financial 
possibility to quit their jobs while actively looking for new employment possibilities. 
Increased labor mobility have in turn shown to increase innovative activity (Kaiser et 
al. 2015). In conclusion I expect tax wedges in general and employer and employee 
social security contributions to have a negative effect on FDI-inflows.    
 
2.3.2 Horizontal FDI 
A multinational firm that engages in horizontal FDI duplicates its production 
processes in new markets. A plant-specific fixed cost is thus incurred, but that cost 
has to be lower than the cost of entering the market trough trade or licensing. To show 
the decision processes of the multinational and determine the condition that needs to 
hold in the first question of investment I follow the way of thought presented in 
Feenstra (2004). Without deriving the function (specified in pp. 387-389) he arrives at 
the following condition: 
 1𝜎 (𝑝!𝑃!)!!! ∗ 𝑌! − 𝑤!𝑎! ≥ 1𝜎 (𝑝!𝑇!"𝑃! )!!! 
           
The left term refers to profits made by investing and operating new production 
facilities in host country i and the right term refers to profits made by exporting from 
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country j to country i. One can clearly see how the wage level in the host country, wi, 
affects total profits of the investment negatively. ai refers to the plant fixed costs in 
the host country, and the larger these two parameters are the larger the profits must be 
in order for the investment to be profitable. In other words, investments in countries 
were the cost of labor is driven up by tax wedges need to be less risky and more 
certain of being successful. This ought to deter some investments and instead lead to 
higher exports to that particular country.  
 
2.4 Previous studies 
There are to my knowledge no previous studies that examine the effect of tax wedges 
on foreign direct investment. However tax wedges could be seen as a cost that makes 
employment more expensive and thus could be compared to an income tax. There has 
not been written a great deal about that either but there is still enough material 
available for me to be able to expect certain results. The main reason to conduct 
foreign direct investments is to increase profits (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009). These 
profits will in turn dampen when subject to energy prices, cost of labor, taxation 
policies and other costs. Most commonly, FDI-flows are estimated to correlate 
negatively with costs that affect the return on investment. In the introductory section I 
mentioned that previous studies have in general found that corporate taxation affect 
FDI decisions in a relatively large negative way, with estimates of semi-elasticities 
ranging from -5 to 0 with a median of -2.9 (De Mooij & Ederveen, 2006). Studies on 
labour taxation tend to point to the same direction. Hansson and Olofsdotter (2013) 
employ a gravity equation and use data on marginal and average labour tax rates for 
27 EU states during 1997-2007 to find that such taxes have a negative impact on FDI. 
They argue that labour taxation do matter, primarily because its burden, in a high-
skilled worker environment, falls on the employer. Labour has traditionally been 
viewed as less mobile than capital, sometimes even inelastic. Daveri and Tabellinni 
(2000) and Bingley and Lanot (2002) however contrast that by specifying that high-
skilled labour tend to be relatively responsive to cross-country differences. As in the 
intra EU-15 case, where an increasing amount of highly skilled workers relocate 
abroad to purse opportunities and job-offerings. This implies a more competitive 
environment where every job offering is accompanied by an increasing amount of 
suitable candidates. In turn, firms have a greater range of potential employees and 
investment options to choose from. This arguably affects the workers’ bargaining 
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power, leading to a more elastic labour demand and also implying that a prospective 
tax cut would not solely lead to higher wages, but also higher profits. Labour taxes 
should therefore realistically affect firms’ costs and also their investment decisions. 
Accordingly tax wedges, which more efficiently capture workers net pay as a % of 
total labour costs should also affect where foreign direct investments are allocated. 
 Higher costs associated with hiring might also affect firms’ abilities to attract 
good labour. If a big portion of the salary goes to paying taxes and/or if the cost of 
hiring high-skilled labour is associated with high social security contributions, it 
might be hard for foreign firms to find and retain desirable labour. The relationship 
between wage level and work effort has previously been found to correlate. 
Intuitively, the wage level and the yearly wage increase should affect the 
effectiveness of labour. Prendergast (1996) examines the relationship between wage 
and work effort and find that compensation policies and other work incentives have a 
positive impact on labour effectiveness. A higher worker morale induced by higher 
wages would theoretically lead to a productivity increase. One possible explanation 
can be drawn from efficiency wage theory, which suggests that a wage level higher 
than the firm’s marginal revenue product would induce workers to increase 
productivity and thus the firm’s revenue and profits. Consequently a higher pay would 
also deter workers from seeking opportunities elsewhere, leading to a higher sense of 
loyalty and greater work effort. A higher pay level cannot solely be seen as a 
motivator; on the contrary, equity theory suggests that the comparison to other 
employees’ wages can lessen worker morale and lead to unproductive behaviour. 
Jones, Gareth and George (2008) who discuss a range of employee motivational 
theories conclude that a disproportionate pay-rise of a colleague can induce less 
productive work efforts.  Consequently labour taxes should have an effect on firm’s 
profits. Either by increasing the factual costs associated to labour, or by decreasing 
the opportunity cost, making leisure less costly and reducing productivity. An FDI 
decision ought therefore to take labour taxes in general and tax wedges in particular 
into account. The World Competitiveness Report (2009) highlights the importance of 
incentives, and stresses its significance in increasing competitiveness. Cross-country 
differences in labour tax wedges could arguably affect these incentives and also have 
a negative impact on firms’ willingness to invest abroad. 
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2.4.1 Common estimation methods 
Most commonly the gravity equation has been used to estimate the determinants of 
trade flows. The gravity equation has been used in several different ways with 
different econometric techniques, each having its advantages and disadvantages. 
Following below is a short walkthrough of some of the most common estimation 
methods.  
 
Figure 2: Common estimation methods 
Estimation 
method 
Advantages Disadvantages References 
Truncated 
OLS 
- Simple - Coefficients are biased 
- Zero flows are eliminated 
Martin and Pham 
(2008) 
Westerlund and 
Wilhelmsson 
(2009 
Tobit - Simple 
- Zero trade 
flows problem 
dealt with 
- Lack of theoretical foundation 
- Probability that an observation 
will be censored and value of 
dependent variable are 
determined by same variables 
Martin and Pham 
(2008); 
Marcoulier 
(2002) 
Panel Fixed 
effects 
-Simple - Time-invariant terms dropped 
- Zero flows eliminated 
Hendersson and 
Millimet (2008); 
Andrews et al. 
(2006) 
Heckman 
two-step 
- Different set of 
variables 
determine value 
of dependent 
variable and 
probability of 
censoring. 
- No 
multicollinearity 
problems 
- Rationale for 
zero trade flows 
-Exclusion variables are required 
- Difficult to find identification 
restriction. 
Davis and 
Kristjánsdóttir 
(2010); Hansson 
and Olofsdotter 
(2013); Razin et 
al. (2004) 
Source: Herrera E. (2013) 
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3. The tax wedge and FDI in the EU15 
The tax wedge measures the income tax plus employee and employer social 
security contributions as a % of total labor costs. Total labor costs are defined as net 
pay plus income tax and employee and employer social security contributions. By 
differentiating the cost of a worker from the net pay of that worker I hope to be able 
to distinguish whether the cost per se would affect the inflow of FDI in any way. The 
tax wedge constellation is different in different countries, and despite the total cost 
being equal in many countries; the separate parts may be designed in totally different 
ways. As mentioned before, the average tax wedge in Denmark and in the 
Netherlands is roughly the same, but their components differ widely. While 
Denmark’s cost of labor does not involve any employer social security contributions 
(SSC) and a tiny 2,8% employee SSC, the Netherlands’ cost of labor has an employer 
SSC of 9,2% and an employee SSC of 13,9%. As seen in table 2, Belgium employs 
the most expensive average work force in the EU15, while Ireland employs the 
cheapest. The average income tax as a % of total labor costs in the EU15 is 15,8%, 
the average employee SSC is 9,1% and the average employer SSC is 17,3%. During 
the last decade the tax wedge on labor has not seen any relative change. The average 
EU15 tax wedge on labor has decreased slightly from 42,7 % in 2000 to 41,9 % in 
2014, which is a decrease of about 2%. The question is now if this decrease would 
facilitate any FDI-inflows, or will economies with stable and relatively low tax 
wedges attract more FDI than countries whose tax wedges are higher. Another 
question that arises is if the tax wedge components matter in any way. The cross-
country differences are high. As shown in table 2, Ireland’s tax wedge on labor 
accounts to 28,2 % of the total labor cost, in Belgium on the other hand it is 55,6 %. 
The percentage of labor costs paid in income tax varies considerably, from 35,6 % in 
Denmark to 7,1 % in Greece and 10,6 % in France. The percentage of labor costs paid 
in employee social security contributions varies from 17,1 % in Germany to 3,6 % in 
Ireland. Lastly the percentage of labor costs paid in employer social security 
contributions is highest in France (27,7 %) and lowest in Ireland (9,7 %).  
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Figure 3: Tax wedge components 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Volume 2014 (No. 96). 
 
Previous papers have to a great extent studied income taxes and their effects 
on FDI flows; I want to argue that the tax wedge might be of equal importance. Lets 
assume for instance that a European firm has decided to invest in a EU-15 country. As 
mentioned above the firm will go through a decision process where different aspects 
of the investment are taken into account. Profit enhancing or diminishing effects 
ought to be important in the localization decision and consequently the cost of labor 
in general and tax wedges on labor in particular should affect decisions. The EU-15 
countries are relatively equal in economic structure, infrastructure, political stability 
and other exogenous variables that might influence an investment decision. A firm 
must then consider what costs are associated with the investment. Depending on the 
firm, the total labor cost, as a % of total costs will differ. As can be seen in table 2 the 
tax wedge on labor differ widely across the union. Table 3 shows net inflows of 
foreign direct investments as a % of GDP and one can clearly see how Luxembourg 
stands out as the biggest net receiver, closely followed by Ireland, Belgium and 
Austria. Interestingly, Ireland has shown a stabile net inflow over the past decade 
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while the other three top countries fluctuate far more. Comparing to the tax wedge on 
labor, Ireland, which employs the cheapest labor, also receives the second most FDI 
as a % to GDP, averaging an annual 17,9% over the time period. Belgium, which 
actually employs the most expensive labor, has an average inflow of 13,8% over the 
time period. 
 
Figure 4: Net inflows of FDI as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance 
of Payments databases, World Bank, International Debt Statistics, and World Bank 
and OECD GDP estimates, 2014. 
 
Except for Luxembourg, the rest of the EU15 score somewhere between 5% (UK and 
Netherlands) and 1% (Italy and Greece).  
The incentive to hire additional workers would depend on what contributions 
the extra worker has on profits, i.e. the difference between marginal revenue (the 
income of hiring an extra worker) and marginal cost (the cost of hiring an extra 
worker). In order to compensate for higher labor costs the worker in that particular 
country must produce more value. One could stretch this further and argue that in 
order to stay profitable, a particular foreign direct investment must yield higher 
revenue the higher the tax wedge. In turn, this would imply that risky investments 
would to a greater extent be drawn to countries were the cost of labor is lower and 
where a bigger part of the revenue could be used to cover other costs associated with 
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the investment. Consequently countries with lower tax wedges should attract more 
foreign direct investment in general and high-skilled workers in particular. 
I believe intra EU-15 investment decisions differ from that of investments 
from companies outside that group. Figure 5 separates total FDI stocks in the EU-15 
from stocks acquired from EU-15 partners, and one can clearly see that intra EU-15 
FDI accounts for roughly 25 percent of total FDI. The red line and the right axis show 
FDI stocks for intra EU-trade whereas the left axis and the blue line shows total FDI 
stocks in the EU-15. The growth rate has been relatively steady across the time 
period, with intra EU-15 FDI stocks averaging a roughly 11% annual increase, 
peaking between 2010 and 201 when it grew by 19,6 %. Total FDI stocks in the EU-
15 grew during the same period by 9,7%, peaking between 2004 and 2005 when it 
grew by 17,1 %. This suggests that intra EU-15 investments are growing relatively 
fast, and companies within the EU, are finding economies close by advantageous to 
invest in.  
 
Figure 5: FDI stocks within EU15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Increasing FDI stocks and flows have thus not been accompanied by an 
overall decrease of the tax wedge on labor. Higher tax wedges however imply that a 
lesser portion of the total labor costs actually goes to the employee, and thus makes 
employment more expensive. 
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4. Methodology and data 
I wish to test whether the theoretical predictions align with the dataset and determine 
if tax wedges on labor in general and cross-country differences and employee and 
employer social security contributions in particular matter in the foreign direct 
investment decision. I follow Blonigen and Davies (2004) and use a log-linear 
specification. This allows me to deal with the skewness common in FDI data. To 
correct for many zero observations and also avoid problems related to sample 
selection bias as much as possible I first use the two-step Heckman estimation 
technique (Davies and Kristjánsdóttir, 2010). This allows me to account for the 
different effects that different independent variables may have on the decision to 
invest or not followed by the amount to invest. In addition I will compare those 
results to a tobit regression, and a panel data fixed effects estimation. New 
investments are associated with sunk costs that have to be paid at the beginning of the 
investment. As Razin et al. (2004) puts it, they do not affect the amount to invest but 
play a key role in determining the investment location. The investment decision is 
characterized by two questions, first whether to invest or not and second how much to 
invest. By closely following the thought process presented in Davis and 
Kristjánsdóttir (2010) I first employ a two-step Heckman-estimation estimation model 
where negative or zero investments are controlled for by adding an extra variable 
calculated by probit regression.  
 As mentioned, a firm can choose to either produce at the home market or 
abroad. Costs include both total production costs and trade costs and are convex 
functions of quantity. In addition firms face firm-level and plant-level fixed costs on 
its home and foreign plants respectively. These costs are unavoidable and must be 
incurred in order to proceed with the investment. The firm is left with a decision 
problem of investing abroad or not, and if it chooses to invest, how much to invest 
Davis and Kristjánsdóttir (2010). This two-stage Heckman estimation process will be 
accompanied by simple tobit and fixed effects regressions to see how the estimates 
are affected if the two-step decision process is ignored. The dataset for bilateral EU15 
FDI flows from 2000 to 2013 is collected from OECD. 
 As mentioned earlier, fixed costs determine the initial entry of FDI and the 
investments in the dataset might have been initiated long before the start of the 
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sample. By using the technique proposed by Razin et al. (2004), positive FDI flows 
are considered as new MNEs entering the host market. As Davis and Kristjánsdóttir 
(2010) states, the downside of this technique might be that the expansions of existing 
projects are overlooked and instead are interpreted as the inflow of new firms.  
 Following the two-step Heckman procedure I employ a tobit regression which 
is a maximum likelihood estimation where probit and regression analysis are 
combined (Dougherty, 2011). By setting the lower limit to zero, I effectively discard 
any negative and non-existant FDI-flows and therefore avoid underestimating the 
effects of the independent variables. Negative flows can be problematic when 
analysing investment flows since they capture the repayment of loans to the investing 
country. This means that during a specific year, new investments and the expansion of 
existing investments might be overlooked and overshadowed by the repayment of 
loans. Finally I employ a Hausman test to determine whether to use fixed or random 
effects in the final regression. The test is designed to show s whether the unobserved 
effects are distributed independently of the dependent variables (Dougherty, 2011). 
The estimation model comprises an unobserved factor ui and a model using random 
effects assumes that the covariance between the unobserved factor and the dependent 
variables is zero. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis (ie. if the covariance between 
ui the dependent variables is zero) we conclude that only fixed effect models are 
consistent estimates. If the null hypothesis is rejected both models are ok but with 
random effect being superior due to lower standard deviation. My test statistic is 
0,0003, and I therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis and employ a fixed effect 
regression, and hence I test for autocorrelation, normality of residuals and 
heteroscedasticity.   
 
4.1 Tobit estimation 
A tobit analysis censors the regression by applying either an upper bound or a lower 
bound to the dependent variable such that observations outside the bound are 
constrained and interpreted as being directly on the limit (Dougherty, 2011). 
Hypothesize the relationship below to be subject to a lower bound YL. 
 𝑌∗ = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋 + 𝑢 𝑌 =   𝑌∗𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑌∗ > 𝑌! 𝑌 = 𝑌!  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑌∗ ≤ 𝑌! 
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Thus negative and zero observations are interpreted as being directly on the limit. 
However since the same variables determine the value of the dependent variable 
together with the probability of censorship and since I expect heteroscedasticity, the 
tobit regression might produce biased estimates (Amemiya, 1984). By excluding 
estimates systematically I may give rise to non-zero expected values of the error term 
and thus also sample selection bias. 
 
4.2 Two-step Heckman estimation and probit 
A way to deal with the possibility of sample selection bias is to employ a two-step 
Heckman estimation model. A probit regression is first used to regress a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if there is a positive FDI-inflow from country j to 
country i at time period t, and value 0 if the flow is non-existent or negative. During 
this method maximum likelihood analysis is used to compute the marginal effects of 
the dependent variables presented in figure 9 in the appendix. For instance, the 
calculations suggest that an increase in distance has a negative effect on FDI-inflows. 
The marginal effects are later put together with the cumulative standardized normal 
distribution, which gives the probability of the event occurring for any composition of 
determinants. After this I construct the inverse mills ratio, which is calculated by 
dividing the sum of each variable evaluated at its mean value multiplied by its probit 
value, and is later included as an explanatory variable in the regression. The inverse 
mills ratio is negative, implying that the error terms in the original model are 
correlated negatively. The thought process behind this method is presented in 
Dougherty (2011, pp. 365-378). 
 During the probit regression a variable Z is defined as a linear function of the 
independent variables that together regulate the probability of the event (positive FDI-
inflows) occurring. 𝑍 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑋! 
 
From this follows the cumulative standardized normal distribution that tells us the 
probability of the FDI-flows for any value of Z, in other words the probability of the 
FDI-flows being positive in the data set. 
 𝑝! = 𝐹(𝑍!) 
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As mentioned before, maximum likelihood analysis is used to compute the marginal 
effects. These are best defined as derivatives of each dependent variable.  𝜗𝑝𝜗𝑋! = 𝑓 𝑍 𝛽! 
where 𝑓 𝑍 = 12𝜋 𝑒!!!!! 
 
which is the standardized normal distribution. Consequently the inverse mills ratio 
(lambda) is computed as follows: 𝜆! = 𝑓(𝑣!)𝐹(𝑣!) 
where the numerator is interpreted as the density function for the error term 
normalized by the standard deviation and the denominator is the probability of being 
positive. Lambda is then used as an explanatory variable in the estimation model to 
correct for omitted variables (i.e. negative and non-existent FDI-flows). In accordance 
to theory the output of the two-step estimation method would be of primary interest. 
 
4.3 Panel data fixed effects model 
The estimation method assumes that each individual has some specific fixed effect 
that is unobserved and thus creates a somewhat biased estimate. The fixed effect 
estimation equation is as follows: 
 𝑌!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!"𝑋!" +   𝛿! + 𝑎! + 𝜖!" 
where           (a) 
𝑎! = 𝛾!𝑍!"!!!!  
 𝛼!   represents unknown intercepts for each country pair and is referred to as an 
unobserved effect. It is comprised of specific unobserved heterogeneity that is unique 
to each country pair. There might be other characteristics to each country pair that 
affects FDI-flows that those in the model. These effects will be controlled for by the 
unobserved effect. To deal with this issue I employ a within-group regression that is 
used to eliminate the unobserved effect by using mean values of the observations of a 
given country pair and then subtracted from the original data set. 
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 𝑎 − [𝑌! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!"𝑋!" +   𝛿𝑡 + 𝑎! + 𝜀!"] 
      = 𝑌!" − 𝑌! = 𝛽!" 𝑋!"# − 𝑋!" + 𝛿 𝑡 − 𝑡 + 𝜀!" − 𝜖! 
Consequently the unobserved effect is removed and FDI-flows are instead explained 
by their means following the variation of the independent variables about their means 
(Doughterty, 2011). However this method implies that any time-invariant variable 
(such as distance, sharing a border, etc.) together with zero observations will be 
dropped. 
 
4.3.1 Heteroscedasticity 
When the error term variance is unequally distributed the dataset is characterized by 
heteroscedasticity. This biases the estimate and defies basic OLS assumptions, 
implying that estimates of standard errors of regression coefficients will be wrong. In 
turn t tests and f tests will be invalid. Since I use different sized country-specific data 
over time, the error term is likely to be affected by the GDP levels of the specific 
countries. In order to correct for this I apply a modified Wald test for group wise 
heteroscedasticity with the null hypothesis being constant variance in the error term. 
By getting a prob >chi2 of 0.000 I reject the null hypothesis and use robust standard 
errors in the regression. 
 
4.3.2 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation implies that the disturbance term depends on its own value in the 
previous time period and thus defying the assumption of independently distributed 
disturbance terms.. Most commonly autocorrelation happens when excluded variables 
affect the dependent variable and this can lead to large variances and wrongly 
estimated standard errors (Dougherty, 2011). By using a Woolridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data I employ the null hypothesis that there is no serial 
correlation. My prob > F = 0,6603 and I thus fail to reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that there is no serial correlation in my panel data. 
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4.4 The gravity equation 
Trade theorists generally employ gravity equations to analyse and predict trade 
patterns. Gravity models are based on the prediction that trade between nations will 
relate positively to the size of their economies and inversely to their trading costs 
(Feenstra, 2004).  A number of variables can be used to capture these costs, 
commonly used are distance, dummies for sharing a common border, being an island 
or being landlocked, sharing a common language or some other cultural feature which 
may help to influence trade. In general gravity models tend to be popular among 
empirical trade economists, mainly due to high explanatory values and the fact that it 
is relatively easy to add additional variables (WTO, 2005). However as Andersson 
and van Wincoop points out (2003) it is important that the interpretation of the 
regression coefficients is done with a structural consistent approach. If the model 
should lack theoretical foundation and therefore risk being subject to subjectivity in 
the interpretation, its credibility might be significantly weakened. Moreover 
econometric problems such as multicollinearity and autocorrelation may arise when 
variables are added in an arbitrary fashion. (WTO, 2005) Gravity models stem from a 
range of different trade theories, from traditional factor proportions to Ricardian types 
and monopolistic models. A common denominator however is that a well specified 
gravity model will control for relative trading costs (Andersson & Van Winoop, 
2003). In short this means that “the propensity of country i to import from country j is 
determined by country i’s trade cost toward j relative to its overall resistance to 
import and to the average resistance facing exporters to country ”(WTO, 2005). An 
issue that has relating to gravity models is the problem with zero trade. This can be a 
result from actual zero trade or from missing data and how this is handled differs 
between researchers. Some simply drop zero trade observation from the sample while 
some argue that disregarding zero trade observations can generate biased estimates 
(Helpman, et al. 2008).  
 
4.4.1 Model specification 
By following previous studies on FDI I employ a gravity model where the 
determinants include standards gravity variables, tax wedge differences, 
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agglomeration economies and other control variables.2 The flow equation is estimated 
as follows: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# = 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇!" + 𝛽!𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹!"#+ 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑀!"!! + 𝐷1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐺 + 𝐷2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺 + 𝐷3𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑂𝑁𝑌+ 𝐷4𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑌 +   𝑋!!"#𝛽 + 𝜆! + 𝑢!" + 𝜀!"# 
     if 
  𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# > 0       
           (1) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# is the natural logarithm of the flow of FDI to host country i from 
investing country j in year t. 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" is the natural logarithm of GDP in the host 
country at time t and 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!"is the natural logarithm of GDP in the investing country 
at time t, both these effects are expected to be positive.  𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇!", representing 
multilateral trade resistance, is the logarithm of the bilateral distance between the two 
countries and is collected from the CEPII database. 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹!"# is the 
difference in tax wedge between the host and investing country at time t, and is 
expected to affect incoming FDI negatively. 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑀!"!! is an agglomeration 
variable based on the stock of FDI in the previous year, CONTIG, COMLANG, 
COLONY and SMCTRY are dummy variables that capture common borders, 
common languages colonial history and being part of the same country in the past 
respectively, 𝑋!!"# is a vector which accounts for country-specific characteristics in 
the host country such as trade volume and GDP per capita, 𝜆!  is a time dummy and 𝜀!"# is the error term with mean zero and variance σ2. I also replace tax wedge 
differentials with actual tax wedge levels in the host country at time t to test whether 
the level matters more than the cross-country differences (eq. 3). Moreover I separate 
employee and employer social security contributions from the tax wedge to see if they 
matter in the investment decision (eq. 4). One must note though that the tax wedge is 
measured as a % of labour cost, whereas employee and employer social security 
contributions are measured as a % of gross pay.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  for	  instance	  Blonigen	  and	  Davies	  (2004),	  Kahouli	  and	  Maktouf	  (2004)	  and	  Wolff	  (2007)	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𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# = 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇!" + 𝛽!𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸!"+ 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑀!"!! + 𝐷1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐺 + 𝐷2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺 + 𝐷3𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑂𝑁𝑌+ 𝐷4𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑌 +   𝑋!!"#𝛽 + 𝜆! + 𝑢!" + 𝜀!"# 
     if      (2) 
  𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# > 0  
 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# = 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟!"+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"   + 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑀!"!! + 𝐷1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐺 + 𝐷2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺+ 𝐷3𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑂𝑁𝑌 + 𝐷4𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑌  𝑋!!"#𝛽 + 𝜆! + 𝑢!" + 𝜀!"# 
     if      (3) 
  𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# > 0  
 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# = 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"   + 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐿𝑂𝑀!"!! + 𝐷1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐺 + 𝐷2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺+ 𝐷3𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑂𝑁𝑌 + 𝐷4𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑌  𝑋!!"#𝛽 + 𝜆! + 𝑢!" + 𝜀!"# 
     if      (4) 
  𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!"# > 0  
 
I use bilateral net FDI inflows provided by Eurostat as my dependent variable. 
The foreign direct investment flows are measured in millions of current US$ and 
shows the value of the investment flows from investing country i to host country j at 
time t.  The most interesting independent variable for my research is wedge, 
wedgediff, employeessc and employerssc. OECD provides data on the tax wedge back 
to 2000. They define the tax wedge as “the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by 
an average single worker with no children and the corresponding total labour cost for 
the employer”. I have compiled this data and calculated the bilateral differences 
across the time period in order to see if these differences have any effect on FDI 
flows. I will also test whether social security contributions by themselves matter in 
the investment decision. This regression will enable me to find out whether 
component differences play a different role than differences of the tax wedge 
altogether. The sizes of the economies are represented by their GDP levels, and are 
expected to have a positive impact on investment flows. Geographical distance can be 
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a somewhat ambiguous variable, since it might affect horizontal and vertical FDI in 
different ways. Neary (2009) points to theory that suggests horizontal FDI to be a 
substitute to trade and thus discouraged by falling trading costs (i.e. shorter 
geographical distance). He does however conclude that experience from the 1990s 
suggest otherwise while stating that the traditional bipolarisation of horizontal and 
vertical FDI no longer can serve as a valid breakdown of foreign direct investment 
types. Yeaple (2003) and UNCTAD (1998) both suggest that most multinational 
enterprises engage in “complex integration strategies”, which cannot be defined as 
neither horizontal nor vertical FDI.    
Gravity models tend to display a relatively high goodness of fit, but one must 
note that their usage in FDI papers are theoretically unfounded (Hansson and 
Olofsdotter, 2013). The impact of markets and geography are too complex to capture 
in a simple and appealing gravity model. Despite working well for horizontal FDI, 
vertical FDI decisions rest on a much more complicated platform where alternate 
investment locations have to be considered, however since intra EU15 FDI is mostly 
horizontal, such a model can be used in an adequate matter. 
 The difference in tax wedges between economies is the main variable in 
consideration. By capturing cross-country differences I try to examine the relationship 
between FDI inflows and differences in labour tax wedges between investing and host 
economies. A larger tax wedge, i.e. a positive difference, would imply that the 
average employer in the host economy spends a bigger proportion of total labour costs 
on taxes. Every salary would thus be accompanied with higher costs and consequently 
every worker would be more expensive. Theoretically, high cross-country tax wedge 
differences should affect incoming FDI in a positive way by offering businesses a 
smaller difference between pre-tax and post-tax returns. 
 In conclusion I include variables that are theoretically supposed to affect FDI 
decisions, such as GDP per capita and host country exports. 
  
5. Results 
Models 1 through 4 are estimated using heckman, tobit and fixed effects estimation 
techniques. The results are presented in order, starting from model 1 and ending at 
model 4.  
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* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
dfres                        4100            4091            3016   
R-sqr                    1008.000        1010.000         207.000   
                                                                    
                                           (0.04)                   
Constant                                    1.723***                
sigma                                                               
                                                                    
                          (14.36)          (3.29)          (6.87)   
Constant                   47.389**         4.623         -15.957*  
                           (7.47)                                   
lambda                    -23.086**                                 
                           (0.29)          (0.20)             (.)   
contig                     -0.749**        -0.118           0.000   
                           (0.30)          (0.26)             (.)   
comlang_ethno              -0.825**        -0.362           0.000   
                           (0.38)          (0.34)             (.)   
colony                      0.635           0.121           0.000   
                           (0.50)          (0.37)             (.)   
smctry                      1.767***        0.728*          0.000   
                           (0.86)          (0.12)             (.)   
ln_dist                     0.949          -1.687***        0.000   
                           (0.81)          (0.13)          (0.29)   
ln_fdistock1               -2.054*          0.426**        -0.131   
                           (2.11)          (0.26)          (1.25)   
ln_gdpcap_i                -6.046**         0.386          -0.913   
                           (3.69)          (0.26)          (0.75)   
ln_exports_i               10.978**        -0.397          -1.028   
                           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.05)   
wedge                      -0.020*         -0.020*          0.052   
                           (2.12)          (0.17)          (1.03)   
ln_gdpi                    -6.217**         0.301           2.656*  
                           (0.05)          (0.05)          (0.75)   
ln_gdpj                     0.371***        0.444***        0.696   
main                                                                
                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se   
                         Heckman1          Tobit1          Fixed1   
                                                                    
5.1 Tax wedge 
The Heckman and Tobit estimation techniques both show a negative significant 
impact of the tax wedge on labour on inflows of FDI. Specifically a 1% increase of 
the tax wedge would lead to a 0,02 % decline in FDI inflows. The fixed effects 
estimation shows a positive but insignificant effect of the tax wedge on FDI-inflows. 
GDP of the investing country behave as expected by impacting inflows positively. On 
the other hand GDP in the host country show mixed results, impacting inflows 
negatively in the Heckman-estimation and showing positive impact in the tobit and 
fixed effects estimation. Estimates of the exports in the host country show significant 
positive effects on FDI-inflows in the Heckman estimation but negative and 
insignificant coefficients in the two other techniques. The stock of FDI in the previous 
year surprisingly impacts inflows negatively in the Heckman and fixed effects 
estimation but positive in the tobit estimation. Moreover dummies for being part of 
the same country in the past and sharing a colonial history show positive effects on 
FDI-inflows, and surprisingly sharing a common language and border impacts FDI 
negatively. As mentioned earlier, time-invariant variables are omitted in the fixed 
effects estimation. 
Figure 6: Tax wedge regressions 
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  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                                                                    dfres                        4104            4094            3018   
R-sqr                    1008.000        1010.000         207.000   
                                                                    
                                           (0.04)                   
Constant                                    1.726***                
sigma                                                               
                                                                    
                          (14.37)          (3.27)          (5.44)   
Constant                   45.159**         2.676         -12.254*  
                           (7.48)                                   
lambda                    -22.935**                                 
                           (0.29)          (0.20)             (.)   
contig                     -0.791**        -0.164           0.000   
                           (0.30)          (0.26)             (.)   
comlang_ethno              -0.905**        -0.445           0.000   
                           (0.38)          (0.34)             (.)   
colony                      0.754*          0.244           0.000   
                           (0.50)          (0.37)             (.)   
smctry                      1.749***        0.716           0.000   
                           (0.86)          (0.12)             (.)   
ln_dist                     0.931          -1.688***        0.000   
                           (0.81)          (0.13)          (0.29)   
ln_fdistock1               -1.942*          0.521***       -0.136   
                           (2.11)          (0.26)          (1.19)   
ln_gdpcap_i                -5.856**         0.533*         -1.310   
                           (3.70)          (0.25)          (0.68)   
ln_exports_i               10.694**        -0.605*         -0.682   
                           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.03)   
wedgediff                   0.009           0.009          -0.017   
                           (2.12)          (0.17)          (1.05)   
ln_gdpi                    -6.132**         0.343*          2.606*  
                           (0.06)          (0.05)          (0.74)   
ln_gdpj                     0.402***        0.474***        0.629   
main                                                                
                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se   
                         Heckman2          Tobit2          Fixed2   
                                                                    
5.2 Tax wedge differences 
The main purpose of introducing cross-country differences in the regression was to 
see if the effects on inflows were estimated to be different when considering the 
difference in the tax wedge on labour between the host and investing country, instead 
of solely looking at the tax wedge levels in the host country. Figure 7 shows that the 
estimates on the tax wedge differences are positive but insignificant for all estimation 
methods. Despite of being insignificant, a positive estimation indicates that increasing 
tax wedge differences ie. increasing the tax wedge in the host economy relative to the 
investing economy impacts positively on investments. The other control variables 
show similar estimates. 
 
Figure 7: Regression on tax wedge differences 
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5.3 Employer social security contributions 
Employer social security contributions show an overall positive impact on inflows of 
FDI. The Heckman-two step estimation technique and the tobit regression show 
positive and significant estimates, where as the fixed effects estimation is also 
positive but insignificant. Consequently a 1% increase of the employer SSC would 
lead to increased FDI-inflows of roughly 0,021% 
 
Figure 7: Employer SSC regression 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
dfres                        4093            4082            3016   
R-sqr                    1008.000        1010.000         207.000   
                                                                    
                                           (0.04)                   
Constant                                    1.715***                
sigma                                                               
                                                                    
                          (14.38)          (3.24)          (7.20)   
Constant                   40.080**         2.095         -17.057*  
                           (7.47)                                   
lambda                    -20.493**                                 
                           (0.29)          (0.20)             (.)   
contig                     -0.838**        -0.284           0.000   
                           (0.30)          (0.25)             (.)   
comlang_ethno              -0.909**        -0.501*          0.000   
                           (0.38)          (0.34)             (.)   
colony                      0.836*          0.387           0.000   
                           (0.50)          (0.37)             (.)   
smctry                      1.598**         0.674           0.000   
                           (0.86)          (0.12)             (.)   
ln_dist                     0.608          -1.735***        0.000   
                           (0.81)          (0.13)          (0.31)   
ln_fdistock1               -1.766*          0.433***       -0.024   
                           (2.11)          (0.25)          (1.17)   
ln_gdpcap_i                -5.114*          0.599*         -1.229   
                           (3.69)          (0.25)          (0.65)   
ln_exports_i                9.723**        -0.364          -0.913   
                           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.10)   
employerssc                 0.021***        0.022***        0.127   
                           (2.12)          (0.17)          (1.03)   
ln_gdpi                    -5.580**         0.198           2.845** 
                           (0.05)          (0.05)          (0.74)   
ln_gdpj                     0.391***        0.455***        0.586   
main                                                                
                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se   
                         Heckman3          Tobit3          Fixed3   
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5.4 Employee social security contributions 
Employee social security contributions are estimated to impact inflows of FDI in a 
negative way when using Heckman and Tobit estimation techniques. Their impact are 
estimated to -0,069 (Heckman) and -0,074 (tobit).The fixed effect model however 
shows a positive impact on FDI flows. 
 
Figure 8: Employee SSC regressio 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
dfres                        4082            4068            3012   
R-sqr                    1008.000        1010.000         207.000   
                                                                    
                                           (0.04)                   
Constant                                    1.704***                
sigma                                                               
                                                                    
                          (14.26)          (3.34)          (5.52)   
Constant                   40.557**         8.295*        -14.850** 
                           (7.48)                                   
lambda                    -17.643*                                  
                           (0.29)          (0.20)             (.)   
contig                     -0.674*         -0.194           0.000   
                           (0.30)          (0.25)             (.)   
comlang_ethno              -0.674*         -0.312           0.000   
                           (0.38)          (0.34)             (.)   
colony                      0.421           0.012           0.000   
                           (0.50)          (0.37)             (.)   
smctry                      1.601**         0.814*          0.000   
                           (0.87)          (0.12)             (.)   
ln_dist                     0.236          -1.786***        0.000   
                           (0.81)          (0.14)          (0.29)   
ln_fdistock1               -1.665*          0.213          -0.195   
                           (2.10)          (0.26)          (1.18)   
ln_gdpcap_i                -4.786*          0.098          -1.430   
                           (3.68)          (0.27)          (0.65)   
ln_exports_i                8.750*          0.100          -0.593   
                           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.03)   
employeessc                -0.069***       -0.074***        0.083*  
                           (2.11)          (0.17)          (1.04)   
ln_gdpi                    -4.910*          0.051           2.852** 
                           (0.05)          (0.05)          (0.75)   
ln_gdpj                     0.382***        0.437***        0.576   
main                                                                
                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se   
                         Heckman4          Tobit4          Fixed4   
                                                                    
	   31	  
6. Discussion and analysis 
I want to start by commenting on the relative insignificance of the fixed effect 
estimations. Due to the large amount of missing values the estimates look somewhat 
bewildering in comparison to the other estimation models. As mentioned in section 4 
the Heckman and Tobit estimations deal more effectively with missing values and 
their estimates are therefore more reliable although the two-step estimation is better 
equipped in controlling for zero variables. The fixed effects estimation considers 
negative flows and simply drop zero flows and time-invariant variables leading to 
biased and non-reliable estimates. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether tax 
wedges on labour impact the inflows of FDI, therefore estimation methods that deal 
with zero flows effectively are better equipped in providing more accurate 
estimations. 
The impact of tax wedges on intra EU15 foreign direct investments were not as 
big as I first anticipated. In hindsight I believe the dataset could have been more 
specialized in order to capture the sectors which probably are most affected by the tax 
wedge on labour and by cross-country differences. The data that I use on tax wedges 
does not differentiate between income groups, and might therefore underestimate the 
effect that tax wedges, tax wedge differences and social security contributions have 
on FDI flows, primarily because most intra EU-15 FDI is horizontal and therefore to a 
greater extent affect knowledge intensive persons. Knowledge-intensive labour, 
which can be said to have an above average income, is more mobile than the average 
worker, implying that data set to capture tax wedges on high-skilled workers might be 
better equipped in capturing the effects that tax wedges on labour might have. 
Workers in those industries are thus more likely to be affected by cross-country 
differences than the average worker and a focus on average wedges might not capture 
those effects to a full extent. Different direct investment types might also react 
differently to different policies and thus also to tax wedges. My research does not 
distinguish between greenfield investments and M&A and is therefore unable to 
capture any effects that are specific to different investment types. It is also unable to 
separate new investment projects from the expansion of existing projects; therefore 
the estimations can be subject to biases when individual large negative flows displace 
the flows of lesser magnitude. For instance new investment projects that are relatively 
risky and therefore small in size will not show in the data if an existing subsidiary in 
the host economy repays an intra-company loan to the investing country. An 
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interesting orientation for future research would be to analyze the different modes of 
entry by themselves and see if there is any evidence of them reacting differently to tax 
wedges and also focus on knowledge intensive industries (intra EU15 case) solely and 
thus using the tax wedge on labor for persons earning above the average salary in 
each country. 
The extent to which a multinational enterprise that invests in a host country 
can attain the advantages it has relative to host companies are affected by the tax 
wedge on labour. If the labour cost is high and if workers receive a relatively small 
amount of that labour cost, alternatives such as exporting or licensing might seem 
more attractive. In accordance with my results and specifically in terms of horizontal 
FDI I would argue that countries with high tax wedges are more likely to deter FDI 
and instead witness foreign firms to enter the economy by other, less costly and less 
risky modes of entry. The attractiveness of a country in a relatively small and 
homogenous group as the EU15 ought to be affected by the means of which a 
company can retain the profits it makes. Since intra EU15 FDI-flows are 
characterized by horizontal FDI, which in turn can be seen as a substitute to trade, an 
interesting scope for future research would be to see if tax wedges also affect trade 
between countries.  
In summary my study is a first step in the analysis of tax wedges on foreign 
direct investment flows. Future research on other time periods and other groups of 
countries would to a great extent improve the knowledge about the effects of tax 
wedges.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion I find that tax wedges in general and employee social security 
contributions in particular, do affect inflows of FDI to some extent. Surprisingly 
employer social security contributions show a positive effect on FDI and this might be 
a result of an earlier point regarding the mobility of labour. However further studies 
need to be conducted in order to be able to draw any absolute conclusions regarding 
the effects of tax wedges on labor on the inflows of FDI. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 9: Probit regression 
 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 10: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      contig        3150     .152381    .3594468          0          1
comlang_et~o        3150    .0571429    .2321522          0          1
      smctry        3150    .0285714    .1666251          0          1
      colony        3150    .0285714    .1666251          0          1
        dist        3150    1339.666    726.4398   173.0333   3362.978
                                                                      
ln_fdistock1        2754    12.24157    1.089608   9.542589    14.2095
 ln_gdpcap_i        2140    10.61083    .4038141    9.35031   11.64166
ln_exports_i        1926    12.47777    .9262168   10.84976   14.34681
   wedgediff        3136   -.0790147    11.21995     -33.58      33.58
       wedge        3150    41.75689    7.722523      22.23       57.1
                                                                      
 employeessc        3150    11.72951      4.8992        2.7      24.04
 employerssc        3150    22.52116    11.13754       -.16      44.03
     ln_gdpi        2940      13.096     1.19817   9.952192   15.13783
     ln_gdpj        2940      13.096     1.19817   9.952192   15.13783
  ln_fdiflow        1374    6.309553     2.33092   -4.50986   11.42803
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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